Airline Korea Flight 007 (also known as KAL007 and KE007 ) is a scheduled Korean Air Line flight from New York City to Seoul via Anchorage, Alaska. On September 1, 1983, the South Korean plane serving the flight was shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor. The Boeing 747 was on its way from Anchorage to Seoul, but deviated from the original planned route and flew through the prohibited Soviet airspace on the timing of US air surveillance missions. The Soviet Air Force treated the unidentified aircraft as a disturbing US spy plane, and proceeded to destroy it with air-to-air missiles, after firing warning shots that were unlikely to be seen by KAL pilots. Korean aircraft finally fell in the sea near Moneron Island west of Sakhalin in the Sea of ​​Japan. All 269 passengers and crew were killed, including Larry McDonald, Representative of Georgia at the House of Representatives of the United States. The Soviets found debris under the sea on Sept. 15, and found flight recorders in October, but this information was kept secret until 1993.
The Soviet Union initially denied any knowledge of the incident, but later admitted shooting down the plane, claiming it was a MASINT spy mission. The Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union said it was a deliberate provocation by the United States to investigate the Soviet Union's military preparedness, or even provoke war. The White House accused the Soviet Union of blocking search and rescue operations. The Soviet Armed Forces suppress the evidence sought by an International Civil Organization (ICAO) investigation, such as the flight recorder, released eight years later, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
This incident was one of the most thrilling moments of the Cold War and resulted in an escalation of anti-Soviet sentiment, particularly in the United States.
As a result of the incident, the United States changed the procedure of tracking aircraft departing from Alaska. The autopilot interface used on the aircraft was redesigned to make it more ergonomic. In addition, the incident was one of the most important events that prompted the Reagan administration to allow global access to the US Global Positioning System (GPS).
The incident was the deadliest shooting of the plane up to that point in aviation history, although its death toll would be surpassed by a US Navy drop in Airline 655 less than five years later, and again by the shooting of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in July 2014.
Video Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Detail penerbangan
Aircraft flying as Korean Air Lines Flight 007 is a commercial aircraft Boeing 747-230B. The first jet flew on January 28, 1972, and was delivered on March 17, 1972, with the CN20559/186 serial number and registration HL7442 (formerly D-ABYH operated by Condor). The plane departed from Gate 15 of John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City on August 30, 1983, to Gimpo International Airport in Gangseo District, Seoul, 35 minutes behind the scheduled departure time of 23:50 EDT (03:50 UTC, 31 August). The flight was carrying 246 passengers and 23 crew members. After refueling at Anchorage International Airport in Anchorage, Alaska, the plane, piloted on this road by captain Chun Byung-in, first officer Son Dong-hui and Flight Engineer Kim Eui-dong, left for Seoul at 04:00 AHDT ( 13: 00Ã, UTC) on August 31, 1983.
Aircrew has an unusually high crew ratio with passengers, as six deadheading crew are on board. Twelve passengers occupy the upper deck class, while in business almost all 24 seats are taken; in economy class, about 80 seats do not contain passengers. There are 22 children under the age of 12 on board. One hundred and thirty passengers plan to connect to other destinations such as Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei.
US Congressman Larry McDonald of Georgia, who was also the second conservative president of John Birch Society, was on a flight. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Senator Steve Symms of Idaho, and Carroll Hubbard of Kentucky Representative boarded the sister plane KAL 015, which flew 15 minutes behind KALÃ,007; they headed, along with McDonald's at KAL 007, to Seoul, South Korea, to attend the 30th anniversary ceremony of the US-South Korea Joint Defense Treaty. The Soviets argued former US president Richard Nixon had sat next to Larry McDonald on KAL 007 but the CIA warned him not to leave, according to the New York Post and the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. (TASS); this is rejected by Nixon.
The flight deviation from the specified route
After take-off from Anchorage, the flight is ordered by air traffic control (ATC) to move towards 220 degrees. About 90 seconds later, ATC directs flights to "continue Bethel directly if able". Upon arriving in Bethel, Alaska, flight 007 enters the northernmost five 50 miles (80 km) wide airways, known as the NOPAC (North Pacific) route, which bridges the Alaska coast and Japan. The special air channel KALÃ,007, R-20 ( Romeo Two Zero ), passes only 17.5 miles (28.2 km) from Soviet airspace off the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula.
The autopilot system used at the time has four basic control modes: HEADING, VOR/LOC, ILS, and INS. HEADING mode maintains the constant magnetic field selected by the pilot. The VOR/LOC mode maintains the aircraft on a particular path, transmitted from VOR (omnidirectional VHF range, a short-range radio signal emitted from a beacon) or a pilot-selected localizer (LOC). The ILS system (landing instrument) causes the aircraft to track vertical and lateral lane beacons, leading to a particular base chosen by the pilot. INS (inertial navigation system) mode maintains the aircraft on lateral paths between the selected route plan routes selected into the INS computer.
When the INS navigation system is properly programmed with the proposed flight plan point, the pilot can rotate the autopilot mode selector switch to the INS position and the aircraft will then automatically track the programmed program's INS path, provided the aircraft is heading in the right direction. and within 7.5 miles (12.1 km) of the course's course. However, if the aircraft is more than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the planned flight path when the pilot turns the autopilot mode selector from HEADING to INS, the aircraft will continue to track the selected heading in HEADING mode as long as the actual position of the aircraft it's more than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the program's programmed INS path. The autopilot computer software instructs the INS mode to remain in "armed" state until the aircraft has moved to a position less than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the desired pathway. Once that happens, the INS mode will change from "armed" to "catch" and the plane will track the course that the flight has planned since then.
HEADING mode of autopilot will usually be activated shortly after takeoff to comply with vectors of ATC, and then after receiving appropriate ATC permissions, to guide the aircraft to intercept the desired INS course path.
Beacon Anchorage VOR is not operating due to maintenance. The crew received a NOTAM (Notice for Airmen) this fact, which was not seen as a problem, as the captain could still check his position at the next VORTAC beacon in Bethel, 346 miles (557 km) away. The plane was required to keep the post assigned 220 degrees, until it could receive a signal from Bethel, then the plane could fly directly to Bethel, as instructed by the ATC, by centralizing the "VOR" path deviation indicator to (VC) and then involving the automatic pilot in VOR/LOC mode. Then, as it passes through the Betel beacon, the flight can start using the INS mode to follow the point that forms the Romeo-20 route around the US coast to Seoul. The INS mode is required for this route, because after Bethel the plane will be out of range from the VOR station.
About 10 minutes after take-off, KALÃ,007, flew on the 245-degree post, started deviating to the right (north) route assigned to Bethel, and continued flying at this constant post for the next five and a half hours.
The simulation and flight analysis of Civil Aviation International Civil Aviation (ICAO) specifies that this deviation may be caused by an airplane autopilot system operating in HEADING mode, after which point should switch to INS mode. According to ICAO, the autopilot does not operate in INS mode because the crew does not activate the autopilot into INS mode (shortly after Cairn Mountain), or they select the INS mode, but the computer does not transition from INERTIAL NAVIGATION LAUNCHED to INS mode because the plane has deviated from the lane by more of 7.5 miles (12.1 km) of tolerance allowed by the inertial navigation computer. Whatever the reason, the autopilot remains in HEADING mode, and the problem is not detected by the crew.
At 28 minutes after takeoff, civil radar on the Kenai Peninsula on Cook Inlet's east coast and with a 175-mile (282 km) radar ridge west of Anchorage, tracks KAL 007 5.6 miles (9.0 km) north of where it should be.
When KAL 007 did not reach Bethel in 50 minutes after take-off, the military radar in King Salmon, Alaska, tracked KAL 007 at 12.6 nautical miles (23.3 km) north of where it should be. There is no evidence to suggest that civilian air traffic controllers or military radar personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base (who are in a position to receive King Salmon radar output) are aware of KAL 007 aberrations in real-time, and therefore can warn aircraft. It has exceeded the predicted deviation of a maximum of sixfold, 2 nautical miles (3.7 km) of error into the expected maximum drift of course if the inertial navigation system is activated.
The divergence of KAL 007 prevents the aircraft from transmitting its position via shorter shorter frequency (VHF) radios. Therefore ask for KAL 015, also on the way to Seoul, to submit a report to air traffic control on its behalf. KALÃ,007 asked KAL 15 015 to restore his position three times. At 14:43 UTC, KAL 007 directly sends a change of estimated time of arrival for the next destination point, NEEVA, to the international aviation service station in Anchorage, but does so via longer-range high frequency radio (HF) than VHF. HF transmission is capable of carrying a longer distance than VHF, but is susceptible to electromagnetic and static interference; VHF is more pronounced with less interference, and is favored by flight crews. The inability to establish direct radio communications to be able to transmit their positions directly does not remind KAL 007 pilots of the ever-increasing differences and is not considered unusual by air traffic controllers. Half way between Bethel and the NABIE road point, KALÃ,007 passes the southern part of the North American Air Defense Air Defense zone. This zone is to the north of Romeo 20 and is off limits to civilian aircraft.
Sometime after leaving the territorial waters of America, KAL Flight 007 crossed the International Date Line, where local dates shifted from 31 August 1983, to 1 September 1983.
KAL 007 continues its journey, continuing to increase its deviation - 60 nautical miles (110 km) on the NABIE land route, 100 nautical miles (190 km) off course at NUKKS, and 160 nautical miles (300 km) on the road. NEEVA - until reaching Kamchatka Peninsula.
Shootdown
In 1983, the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union has risen to levels not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis due to several factors. These include the United States Strategic Defense Initiative, the planned deployment of Pershing II weapons systems in Europe in March and April, and FleetEx '83 -1, the largest naval exercise ever held to date in the North Pacific. The Soviet military hierarchy (especially the old guard led by Soviet Secretary General Yuri Andropov and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov) saw these acts as a rash and unstable; they were very suspicious of US President Ronald Reagan's intentions and openly feared he was planning a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. This fear culminated in RYAN, the codename for a secret secret-secret program initiated by Andropov to detect potential nuclear-sneaking attacks that he believed was being planned by Reagan.
Aircraft from USS Midway and USSÃ, Enterprise repeatedly disabling Soviet military installations on the Kuril Islands during FleetEx '83, resulting in dismissals or reprimands against Soviet military officers who could not fire them. On the Soviet side, RYAN is expanded. Lastly, there is a high warning around the Kamchatka Peninsula at the time of KAL 007 in the vicinity, due to Soviet missile tests scheduled for the same day. The US Air Force's Boeing RC-135 surveillance aircraft in the area monitored missile tests on the peninsula.
At 15:51 UTC, according to Soviet sources, KAL 007 entered a restricted airspace on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The buffer zone is extended 200 kilometers (120 mi) from Kamchatka beach and is known as the flight information area (FIR). The radius of 100 kilometers (62 mi) from the buffer zone closest to the Soviet territory has the appointment of additional prohibited air spaces. When KAL 007 about 130 kilometers (81 mi) from Kamchatka beach, four MiG-23 fighter planes rushed to intercept Boeing 747.
Significant command and control issues were experienced when attempting to vector a quick military jet to Boeing before they ran out of fuel. In addition, the chase becomes more difficult, according to Soviet Air Force Captain Aleksandr Zuyev, who defected to the West in 1989, because ten days before the Arctic curse had dropped the main warning radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula. He further stated that the local officials responsible for fixing the radar being lied to Moscow misreported that they had repaired the radar. If this radar were to operate, it would allow the tapping of the stranded aircraft approximately two hours earlier with plenty of time for proper identification as a civilian aircraft. But on the contrary, the unidentified jet plane crossed the Kamchatka Peninsula back into international airspace over the Okhotsk Sea without being intercepted. In his explanation to 60 Minutes , Zuyev states:
Some people lie to Moscow, trying to save their ass.
The Commander of the Far Eastern Air Defense Force, General Valery Kamensky, insisted that KAL 007 would be destroyed even above the neutral waters but only after positive identification indicates that the plane was not a passenger plane. His subordinate, General Anatoly Kornukov, commander of the Sokol Air Base and later became commander of the Russian Air Force, insisted that there was no need to make a positive identification because the "intruder" had flown over the Kamchatka Peninsula.
General Kornukov (to Military-General Headquarters Kamensky): (5:47) "... only destroy it even if it is above the neutral waters? Is the order to destroy it more water-neutral?. "
Kamensky :" We must find out, maybe it is a civilian craft or God knows who. "
Kornukov : "What is civil? [It] has flown over Kamchatka! It [came] from the sea without identification I gave the order to strike if it crossed the state border."
The Soviet Air Defense Force unit that had been tracking South Korean aircraft for more than an hour when entering and leaving Soviet airspace now classifies the aircraft as a military target when it reentered their airspace over Sakhalin. After a protracted ground interception, the three Su-15 fighters (from the Dolinsk-Sokol air base) and MiG-23 (from Smirnykh Air Base) made a visual contact with Boeing. The pilot from the Su-15 main shot fired warning shots, but then pulled back in 1991, "I fired four bursts, over 200 rounds.For all that good.After all, I loaded with shell armor piercing, not clam burners. It's doubtful whether anyone can see them. "
At this point, KAL 007 contacts the Tokyo Area Control Center, requesting permission to board a higher flight level for fuel economy reasons; the request was granted, so Boeing started climbing, slowly slowed by swapping speed to altitude. The decrease in speed caused fighters chase to surpass Boeing and interpreted by Soviet pilots as an evasive maneuver. The order to shoot KALÃ, 007 down was given when it was about to leave Soviet airspace for the second time. At about 18:26 UTC, under pressure from General Kornukov, and the controller of the land not to let the plane escape into international airspace, the main fighter can return to the position where he can fire two K-8 (NATO reporting name: AA -3 "Anab") air-to-air missiles on the plane.
Soviet pilot record of shootdown
In a 1991 interview with Izvestia, Major Genadi Osipovich, the Su-15 interceptor pilot who shot down 747, spoke of his memory of the events leading up to the shootings. Contrary to the official Soviet statement at the time, he remembered telling the ground controller that there were "blinking lights". He continued, saying that "I see two rows of windows and know that this is a Boeing I know this is a civilian plane but for me this does not mean anything It is very easy to convert the type of civilian aircraft into one for military use. further not giving a detailed description of the aircraft to the ground controller: "I did not say that it was a Boeing type aircraft; they did not ask me."
Commenting on as KAL 007 slowed as it climbed from flight level 330 to flight level 350, and later on its maneuver for a missile launch, Osipovich said:
They [KALÃ, 007] quickly lowered their speed. They fly at 400 km/h (249 mph). My speed is over 400. I can not fly more slowly. In my opinion, the intention of the intruder is innocent. If I do not want to go to a kiosk, I will be forced to surpass them. That's exactly what happened. We are already flying over the island [Sakhalin]. It's narrow at that point, the target is about to go... Then the ground [controller] gives the command: "Destroy the target...!" That's easy to say. But how? With a shell? I have spent 243 rounds. Ram it? I always think of it as a bad taste. Ramming is a last resort. Just in case, I've finished my turn and descended on him. Then, I have an idea. I dropped under it about two thousand yards (6,600 feet)... afterburner. Activate the missile and bring the nose up sharply. Success! I have a key.
We shot down the plane legally... Then we started lying about the small details: the plane was supposed to fly without turning on the lights or the spotlights, the bullets were fired, or that I had radio contact with them on the emergency frequency 121.5. megahertz.
Soviet command hierarchy of shootdown
Transcripts of Soviet real-time military communications from the shootings show the chain of command of the top generals to Major Osipovich, the Su-15 interceptor pilot who shot down KAL 007. In reverse order, they are:
- Major Gennady Osipovich,
- Captain Titovnin, Combat Control Center - Combat Division
- Lt. Colonel Maistrenko, Smirnykh Air Base Fighter Division, Acting Chief of Staff, who confirmed the shooting order to Titovnin
- "Titovnin: You confirmed the assignment?
- "Maistrenko: Yes."
- Lt. Colonel Gerasimenko, Acting Commander, 41st Combat Regiment.
- "Gerasimenko: (to Kornukov) Task accepted: Destroy 60-65 targets with missile shots Accept control of the fighters from Smirnikh."
- General Anatoly Kornukov, Commander of Sokol - Sakhalin Air Base.
- "Kornukov: (to Gerasimenko) I repeat the task, shoot missiles, shoot at 60-65 targets Destroy 60-65 target... Control the MiG 23 from Smirnikh, call sign 163, call 163 He is behind the current target... Destroy the target!... Perform the task, Destroy! "
- General Valery Kamensky, Commander of the Far Eastern Military District Air Defense Force.
- "Kornukov: (To Kamensky)... just destroy it even if it is on neutral waters? Is it a command to destroy it on neutral waters?
- General of the Army Ivan Moiseevich Tretyak, Far Eastern Military District Commander.
- "Weapons are used, weapons passed at the highest level Ivan Moiseevich gives him authority Hello, hello.", "Say again.", "I can not hear you clearly now," " He gave orders, Hello, hello, hello. "," Yes, yes. "," Ivan Moiseevich gave orders, Tretyak. "," Roger, roger. "," Weapons are used on his orders. "
Flight post-attack
At the time of the attack, the plane sailed at an altitude of about 35,000 feet (11,000 m). Records taken from the aircraft cockpit voice recorder show that the crew is not aware that they are off track and breaking Soviet airspace. Immediately after the missile explosion, the plane began a 113-second arc upward due to a broken crossover cable between the left and right outboard lifts.
At 18: 26:46 UTC (03:26 Japanese time, 06:26 Sakhalin time), at the top of the arc at an altitude of 38,250 feet (11,660 m), either the pilot releases the autopilot, or (more likely), the autopilot is disabled automatically. Now controlled manually, the plane started down to 35,000 feet (11,000 m). From 18:27:01 to 18:27:09, the flight crew reports to the Tokyo Area Control Center informing that KAL 007 for "down to 10,000" [legs; 3,000 m]. At 18:27:20, the ICAO chart of the Digital Flight Data Recorder tape shows that after the phase drops and the 10 second "rising nose", KAL 007 is now flattened at a pre-missile altitude level of 35,000 feet (11,000 ft). m), the forward acceleration now returns to the pre-missile release level of zero acceleration, and the air velocity has returned to pre-detonation velocity.
Yaw (oscillation), started at the time of the missile explosion, continued to decline until the end of 44 minutes of the second part of the tape. Boeing did not break, exploded or degenerated immediately after the attack; it continued to decline gradually over four minutes, then leveled at 16,424 feet (5,006 m) (18: 30-18: 31 UTC), rather than continuing to fall to 10,000 (3,000 m) as previously reported to the Tokyo Area Control Center, this altitude for almost five more minutes (18:35 UTC).
The last cockpit voice recorder entry took place at 18:27:46 while in this phase of descent. At 18:28 UTC, the aircraft was reportedly spinning northwards. The ICAO analysis concludes that the crew "maintains limited control" of the aircraft. However, this only lasts for five minutes. The crew then lost control. The plane began to descend rapidly in a spiral on Moneron Island as far as 2.6 miles (4.2 km). The plane fell into the ocean, not far from the west coast of Sakhalin Island. All 269 people in it died instantly because of blunt trauma. The plane was last seen visually by Osipovich, "somehow descending slowly" on Moneron Island. The aircraft disappeared from long-range military radar in Wakkanai, Japan at an altitude of 1,000 feet (300 m).
KAL 007 may be attacked in international airspace, with a Russian report in 1993 that contains missile shooting locations outside its territory in 46Ã, Â ° 46? 27? N 141Ã, Â ° 32? 48? E , even though the intercepting pilot stated otherwise in the next interview. Initial reports that the plane had been forced to land at Sakhalin soon proved wrong. One of these reports was delivered by telephone by Orville Brockman, a spokeswoman for the Washington office of the Federal Aviation Administration, told the press secretary Larry McDonald, was that the FAA in Tokyo had been told by the Civil Aviation Bureau of Japan that "Japan's self-defense radar strength confirms that Hokkaido radar follows Air Korea to a landing in Soviet territory on the island of Sakhalinska and confirmed by the manifestation that Congressman McDonald was in it.
A Japanese fisherman aboard the 58th Chidori Maru ship was later reported to the Japan Maritime Safety Agency (this report was cited by ICAO analysis) that he had heard the plane at low altitude, but had not seen it yet. Then he heard "a loud noise followed by a bright light on the horizon, then another boring sound and a less intense flash of light on the horizon" and smell the fuel of flight.
Soviet command response to post-blasting flight
Although the interceptor pilot reported to ground control, "Target destroyed", the Soviet command, from general downwards, showed surprises and worries on KAL 007's advanced flight, and the ability to regain altitude and maneuverability. This concern continued into the next level flight KALÃ,007 at an altitude of 16,424 ft (5,006 m), and then, after nearly five minutes, through a spiral derivative on Moneron Island. (See Korean Air Lines 007 transcript of the flight from 18:26 UTC and so on: "Lieutenant Colonel Novoseletski: Well, what happened, what was it, who guided him - he locked why he did not shoot him?")
Missile damage to plane
The following damage to the aircraft is determined by ICAO from its analysis of the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder:
Hydraulics
KALÃ,007 has four redundant hydraulic systems in which one, two, and three systems are damaged or destroyed. There is no evidence of damage to the four systems. Hydraulics provide the actuation of all primary and secondary flight controls (except for the leading edge at the last) and the recall of landing gear, extension, steering wheel, and braking. Each axis of the main flight control receives power from the four hydraulic systems. After the missile explosion, jumbo jets begin to experience oscillation (yawing) because the damper yaw damper is damaged. Yawing will not happen if one or two hydraulic systems are fully operational. The result is that the control column does not push forward on the impact (should be done because the plane is on autopilot) to lower the plane to a previous altitude of 35,000 feet (11,000 m). Autopilot failures to improve elevation indicate that the number three hydraulic system, which operates the autopilot actuator, the system that controls the elevator of the aircraft, is damaged or damaged. The airspeed and acceleration rate of KAL 007 began to decline as the plane began to rise. At twenty seconds after the missile explosion, there was a click on the cabin, which was identified as an "automatic pilot breaker" sound. Neither the pilot nor the co-pilot has disconnected the autopilot and manually pushed the control column forward to bring the lower plane. Although the autopilot has been turned off, manual mode does not start functioning for twenty seconds. Manual system failures to execute commands show failure in one and two hydraulic systems. With the wings flapping up, "the control is reduced to the inboard right of the aileron and the deepest part of the spoiler on each side".
Left wing
Contrary to Major Osipovich's statement in 1991 that he had removed half of the left wing of KAL 007, the ICAO analysis found that the wing was still intact: "The interceptor pilot stated that the first missile hit near the tail, while the second missile took off half of the plane's left wing. The interceptor pilot's statement that the second missile shot half of the left wing might be wrong, the missiles fired at two-second intervals and would be detonated at the same interval.The first was detonated at 18: 26: 02 UTC The last radio transmission from KE007 to Tokyo Radio was between 18 : 26: 57 and 18: 27: 15 UTC using HF [high frequency].HF 1 airborne radio aircraft positioned to the left of the wingtips indicates that the left wing tip is still intact today.Also, aircraft maneuvers after the attack show no widespread damage on the left wing. "
Machine
Co-pilot reported to Captain Chun twice during the flight after a missile explosion, "Normal engine, sir."
Tail section
The first missiles were controlled by radar and approached proximity, and detonated 50 meters (160 feet) behind the plane. Sending fragments forward, it cuts or disconnects the crossover cable from the left elevator to the right lift. This, with damage to one of the four hydraulic systems, causes the KAL 007 to rise from 35,000 to 38,250 feet (10,670 to 11,660 m), where the autopilot point is released.
Fuselage
Fragments from air-to-air missiles near airtight blown 50 meters (160 feet) behind the plane, punctured the fuselage and caused rapid decompression of the pressurized cabin. The 11-second interval between the sound of the missile blasting is picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and the sound of the audible alarm in the cockpit allows the ICAO analyst to determine that the size of the burst onto the pressurized aircraft is 1.75 square feet (0.163 m 2 )).
Maps Korean Air Lines Flight 007
Search and save
As a result of the Cold War tensions, Soviet search and rescue operations were not coordinated with the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Consequently no information is shared, and each party seeks to harass or obtain evidence to imply another. The flight data recorders are a key part of the evidence sought by both governments, with the United States insisting that independent observers from ICAO were present on one of their search ships at the event they found. The international boundaries are not well-defined on the high seas, leading to many confrontations between the large number of opposing naval ships assembled in the area.
Search and rescue of Soviet missions to Moneron Island
The Soviets did not recognize shooting the plane until 6 September, five days after the plane was shot down. Eight days after the shooting, the Soviet Marshal and General Staff Chief Nikolai Ogarkov denied knowing where KAL 007 had come down, "We can not give a proper answer about the place where [KAL 007] fell because we ourselves did not know the place in the first place. "
Nine years later, the Russian Federation handed over a transcript of Soviet military communications indicating that at least two documented search and rescue missions (SARs) were booked within half an hour of an attack to the last Soviet verified location of the descending jumbo jet, Moneron Island: The first search was ordered from Smirnykh Air Base at Sakhalin center at 18:47 UTC, nine minutes after KAL 007 disappeared from Soviet radar screen, and carrying rescue helicopters from Khomutovo air base (civilian and military airport in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk City in southern Sakhalin), and Tugboat Soviet border into the area.
The second search was ordered eight minutes later by the Deputy Commander of the Far Eastern Military District, General Strogov, and involved civilian trawlers in the area around Moneron. "What border guards we now have near Moneron Island, if they are civilians, send [them] there soon." Moneron is only 4.5 miles (7.2 km) long and 3.5 miles (5.6 km) wide, is located 24 miles (39 km) because west of Sakhalin Island in the 46Ã, Â ° 15? N 141Ã, Â ° 14? E ; it is the only land in the whole of the Tatars.
Search KALÃ,007 in international waters
Immediately after the shooting, South Korea, the owner of the aircraft and therefore a major consideration for jurisdiction, pointed to the United States and Japan as a search and rescue agency, thus making it illegal for the Soviet Union to rescue the aircraft, provided it was found outside the Soviet. territorial waters. If it is done, the United States will now legally entitled to use violence against the Soviets, if necessary, to prevent the retrieval of any part of the aircraft.
On the same day of the shooting, Rear Admiral William A. Cockell, Commander, Task Force 71, and skeleton staff, taken by helicopter from Japan, embarked on the USS
On October 17, Rear Admiral Walter T. Piotti, Jr. took command of the Task Force and its Search and Rescue mission from Rear Admiral Cockell. The first sought is an area of ​​"60 square miles" (high probability) <160,000 km 2 ). This did not work. On October 21, Task Force 71 expanded its search in coordinates that include, in an arc around the Soviet border north of Moneron Island, an area of ​​225 square miles (583 km 2 ), reaching west of Sakhalin Island. This is a "most likely" area. The search area is beyond the territorial limits claimed by the Soviets (22 km). The northwesternmost point of the quest touched the limits of the Soviet territory closest to Nevelsk's naval port at Sakhalin. Nevelsk is 46 nautical miles (85 km) from Moneron. This larger search also did not work.
The ships used in search, for the Soviet side as well as the US side (US, South Korea, Japan) are civilian trawlers, especially those equipped for SAR and SAS operations, and various types of warships and support vessels. The Soviet side also employs civil and military divers. The Soviet quest, beginning on the day of the shootings and continuing through November 6, is limited to an area of ​​60 square miles (160 km 2 ) "high probability" in international waters, and within the Soviet territorial waters to the north Moneron Island. Areas in Soviet territorial waters are off limits to US, South Korean and Japanese ships. From September 3 to 29, four ships from South Korea joined the search.
Piotti Jr., commander of Task Force 71 Fleet 7 will summarize the US and the Allies, and then Soviet operations, Search and rescue:
Not because the search for hydrogen bombs disappeared from Palomares, Spain, the US Navy made a massive search effort or imported the search of the KAL Flight 007 ruins.
Within six days after the fall of KAL 007, the Soviets had deployed six ships to the common crash area. Over the next 8 weeks of observation by US naval units, this number increased to the daily average of 19 Soviet naval, naval and commercial ships (but undoubtedly underwater) in the Search and Rescue area (SAS). The number of Soviet ships in the SAS region during this period ranged from a minimum of six to thirty-two and included at least forty-eight different ships consisting of forty different ship classes.
These missions met with intervention by the Soviets, who violated the 1972 Sea Incident agreement, and included false flags and false light signals, sent an armed warring party to threaten to board additional Japanese leased vessels (blocked by ship interposition the US war), interfering with helicopters coming from USS Elliot (7 September), trying to crash into rigs used by South Korea in their quadrant searches, dangerous maneuvers of Gavril Sarychev and almost - collide with USSÃ, Callaghan (15 September 18), remove US sonar, fake pinger settings in international waters, send backfire bombers armed with nuclear-armed missiles into the air to threaten US Navy units, mutual cross in front of US combat ships (26 October), cut and attempted to cut the mooring of Japanese auxiliary ships, especially Kaiko Maru III, and radar locking by Soviet Kara roaming, Petropavlovsk , and Kashin-c lass destroyer, Odarennyy , targeting US naval vessels and US Coastal Guards USCGC Munro (WHEC-724), USS Towers , escorting the USS Conserver , encountered all of the above breakdowns and was involved in a collision with Odarennyy (September 23-27).
According to ICAO: "The location of the main cane is not specified... the approximate position is 46 Â ° 34? N 141 Â ° 17 ° E , located in international waters. "This point is about 41 miles (66 km) from Moneron Island, about 45 mile (72 km) from Sakhalin beach and 33 miles (53 km) from the point of attack.
Piotti Jr., commander of Task Force 71 Fleet 7, believes the search of KAL 007 in international waters is searching in the wrong place and is rated:
If TF [task force] 71 is allowed to search without restrictions imposed by territorial waters claimed, the plane has a good chance of being discovered. No ruins of KALÃ,007 were found. However, the established operation, with a 95% confidence level or above, that junk, or significant portion of the plane, does not lie within the probability area beyond the 12 nautical miles claimed by the Soviets as their territorial border.
At the ICAO trial on September 15, 1983, J. Lynn Helms, head of the Federal Aviation Administration, stated: "The Soviet Union has refused to allow search and rescue units from other countries to enter Soviet territorial waters to search for KAL 007 remains. that, the Soviet Union has blocked access to the crash site and refused to cooperate with other interested parties, to ensure rapid recovery of all technical equipment, debris and other materials. "
Time and human artifact
Surface findings
No body parts were found by Soviet search teams from sea level in their territorial waters, although they would then deliver clothing and shoes to a US-Japanese delegation to Nevelsk in Sakhalin. On Monday, September 26, 1983, a delegation of seven Japanese and US officials who arrived on the Japanese patrol boat Tsugaru had met with six Soviet delegates at the port of Nevelsk on Sakhalin Island. Major General KGB A. I. Romanenko, Commander of the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands border guards, led the Soviet delegation. Romanenko submitted to the US and Japan, among others, single and paired footwear. With footwear taken by Japan, the total became 213 men's, women's and children's shoes, sandals, and athletic shoes. The Soviets indicate that these items are all that they take floating or on the banks of the Sakhalin and Moneron islands.
Passenger family members KAL 007 later stated that these shoes were worn by their loved ones for the flight. Sonia Munder had no trouble recognizing his sneakers, one of Christian 14 and one of Lisi at age 17, in the complicated way his children tied them up. The other mother said, "I recognize them like that.You see, there are many types of unfamiliar signs that strangers do not know.This is how I recognize them, my daughter likes to wear them."
Another mother, Nan Oldham, identified his son John's shoes from a photo in Life magazine from 55 of 213 shoes - apparently, a random array that was exhibited in the first days at Chitose Air Force Base in Japan. "We saw a photo of his shoe in a magazine," Oldham said, "We follow up through KAL and a few weeks later, a package arrives, the shoe is inside: size 11 sneakers with creamy white paint." John Oldham took his seat on line 31 of KAL 007 in wearing that creamy white painted sneakers.
Nothing was found by the US-Japan-South Korea search and rescue operation in international waters at the specified crash site or in the 225 square-mile search area (770 km 2 ).
Hokkaido find
Eight days after the shooting, a human body appeared on the northern coast of Hokkaido, Japan. Hokkaido is about 30 miles (48 km) below the southern tip of Sakhalin in the Soya Strait (the southern tip of Sakhalin is 35 miles (56 km) from Moneron Island located west of Sakhalin). ICAO concluded that these objects were brought from Soviet waters to the coast of Hokkaido to the south west of Sakhalin Island. All Tartar Strait currents are relevant to the flow of Moneron Island to the north, except for this southern current between Moneron Island and Sakhalin Island.
These human remains, including body parts, tissues, and two partial torso, total 13. All can not be identified, but one partial body is a Caucasian woman as shown by reddish hair on a partial skull, and one partial body is an Asian child (with embedded glass). No luggage was found. Of the non-human remnants that Japan restored are various items including dentures, newspapers, chairs, books, eight KAL paper cups, shoes, sandals and sneakers, camera casing, a "please fasten seat belts" sign, oxygen mask, handbags, a bottle of dishwashing liquid, some blouses, a 25-year-old passenger ID card from Mary Jane Hendrie from Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario, Canada, and the passenger card of Kathy Brown-Spier. These items generally come from airplane passenger cabins. None of the items found generally come from aircraft cargo, such as suitcases, packing boxes, industrial machinery, instruments, and sports equipment.
Russian divers reported
In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian newspaper Izvestia published a series of interviews with Soviet military personnel who had been involved in rescue operations to locate and recover aircraft parts. After three days of searches using trawlers, side-scan sonar, and diving bells, the wreckage was discovered by Soviet seekers at a depth of 174 meters (571 feet) near Moneron Island. Since no human remains or luggage were found on the surface in the impact area, divers expected to find the remains of passengers trapped in the wreckage of a submerged plane on the seafloor. When they visited the site two weeks after the shooting, they found that the debris was in small pieces and there were no bodies:
I have the idea that it will be intact. Well, maybe a little banged... The divers will get in the plane and see everything there is to see. In fact it is completely destroyed, scattered like firewood. The biggest thing we saw was a very strong braces - they were about one and a half inches long or two feet wide and 50-60 cm wide. As for the rest - broken into small pieces...
According to Izvestia, divers have only ten encounters with the remains of passengers (tissues and body parts) in debris areas, including one partial body.
Tinro ll diary of Captain Mikhail Igorevich Girs: Submergence October 10. Cut off aircraft, spar wings, aircraft shells, cables, and clothing. But - no one. The implication is that all this has been dragged here by the trawl rather than falling from the sky...
Vyacheslav Popov: "I will confess that we are very relieved when we find that there is no corpse at the bottom Not only the body, there is also no suitcase or big bag.I did not miss a single dive.I have quite a clear impression: The plane is full of garbage, but there really is not anyone there.Why? Usually when a plane crashes, even a small one... As a rule there are suitcases and bags, or at least a handle from a suitcase. "
A number of civil divers, whose first dive occurred on September 15, two weeks after the shootings, claimed that Soviet military smugglers and trawlers had been working in front of them:
Diver Vyacheslav Popov: "As we have learned, before we ship trawlers have done some 'work' in the specified quadrant.It's hard to understand what the military means to see in trawling operations.First dragging everything at random around the bottom by trawling, and then sending submersibles?... It is clear that things should be done in reverse order. "
ICAO also interviewed some of these divers for the 1993 report: "In addition to metal scraps, they observe personal items, such as clothing, documents and wallets, although some evidence of human remains is noticed by divers, they do not find corpses. "
Political events
Early Soviet rejection
Secretary-General Yuri Andropov, on the advice of Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, but against the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initially decided not to make a confession to lower the plane, arguing that no one would know or be able to prove otherwise.. As a result the TASS news agency reported twelve hours after the shooting only that an unidentified plane, flying without lights, had been intercepted by Soviet warplanes after it violated Soviet airspace over Sakhalin. The plane was allegedly failing to respond to warnings and "continue its flight into the East Sea". Some commentators believe that the improper way in which political events are handled by the Soviet government is influenced by the health of failed Andropov, who was hospitalized permanently in late September or early October 1983 (Andropov died in February next).
In a 2015 interview Igor Kirillov, an anchor of Soviet senior news, said that he was originally given a TASS report printed for announcing news on September 1, which included "open and honest" acknowledgment that the plane was shot down by error (call of wrong assessment by the Commando Far East Air Defense). However, upon the opening of the nightly credit program Vremya scrolling, an editor ran in and took a piece of paper out of his hand, giving another TASS report "totally opposite" with the first and the honest.
US. further reactions and developments
The shooting occurred at a very stressful time in US-Soviet relations during the Cold War. The US adopted a strategy of releasing large amounts of highly secret intelligence information to exploit the huge propaganda gains over the Soviet Union. Six hours after the plane crashed, the South Korean government issued an announcement that the plane was simply forced to land suddenly by the Soviets, and that all passengers and crew members survived.
Foreign Minister George P. Shultz held a press conference about the incident at 10:45 pm on September 1, where he disclosed some details of intercepted Soviet communications and denounced the actions of the Soviet Union.
On 5 September 1983, President Reagan condemned the shooting of the plane crash as "the slaughter of Korean airlines", "a crime against humanity that should not be forgotten" and "acts of barbarism... [and] inhumane brutality". The following day, US ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick delivered an audio-visual presentation at the United Nations Security Council, using an audio cassette of Soviet pilot radio conversations and a 007 Flight path map in describing his shootings. After this presentation, TASS admitted for the first time that the plane was actually shot down after the warning was ignored. The Soviets challenged many facts presented by the US, and revealed the presence of an previously unknown USF RC-135 reconnaissance plane whose course had crossed KALÃ,007.
On September 7, Japan and the United States jointly released a transcript of Soviet communications, intercepted by a hearing post in Wakkanai, to the United Nations Security Council emergency session. Reagan issued a National Security Directive stating that the Soviets were not released, and began "major diplomatic efforts to keep international and domestic attention focused on Soviet action". The move was seen by the Soviet leadership as a confirmation of Western bad intentions.
The US-Soviet summit, the first in nearly a year, was scheduled for September 8, 1983 in Madrid. The Shultz-Gromyko meeting took place, but was overshadowed by the event KALÃ, 007. This ended in a fierce, with Shultz stating: "Foreign Minister Gromyko's response to me today is even more unsatisfactory than the response he gave in public yesterday. totally unacceptable. " Reagan ordered the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on September 15, 1983, to revoke the Aeroflot Soviet Airlines license to operate flights to and from the United States. Aeroflot flights to North America were consequently only available through Canadian cities and Mexico, forcing the Soviet foreign minister to cancel a trip scheduled to the United Nations. Aeroflot service to the US was not restored until 29 April 1986.
The ICAO emergency session was held in Montreal, Canada. On September 12, 1983, the Soviet Union used its veto to block a UN resolution condemning it for shooting down the plane.
Shortly after the Soviet Union shot down KAL 007, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, operating a commercial airport around New York City, denied the landing rights of Soviet aircraft, in violation of the UN Charter which requires the host country to allow all member states access to the UN. In reaction, TASS and several people at the UN raised the question of whether the UN should move its headquarters from the United States. Charles Lichenstein, acting as permanent US representative to the UN under Ambassador Kirkpatrick, replied, "We will not get in your way.The US mission members to the UN will go down on the dock while waving your arms as you sail away to the sunset. Government officials quickly announced that Lichenstein was just talking for himself.
In the context of the RYAN Operation Cold War, the Strategic Defense Initiative, the deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe, and the upcoming Able Archer Exercise, the Soviet Government considers incidents with South Korean planes as a war sign. The Soviet hierarchy took the official line that KAL Flight 007 was a spy mission, as it "flew deep into Soviet territory for several hundred kilometers, without responding to the signal and disobeying the command of interceptor fighter". They claim the goal is to investigate air defenses from the highly sensitive Soviet military sites on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island. The Soviet government expressed regret for the loss of life, but did not apologize and did not respond to the demands of compensation. Instead, the Soviet Union blamed the CIA for this "criminal and provocative act".
Investigation
NTSB
Since the plane had departed from US soil and US citizens had died in the incident, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was legally asked to investigate. On the morning of September 1, the head of NTSB in Alaska, James Michelangelo, received an order from NTSB in Washington on the orders of the State Department that required all documents relating to the NTSB investigation to be sent to Washington, and informed him that the State Department would now conduct an investigation.
The US State Department, after closing the NTSB investigation on the grounds that it was not an accident, pursued an ICAO investigation instead. Commentators such as Johnson point out that this action is illegal, and that in delaying the investigation into ICAO, the Reagan administration effectively blocked sensitive political or military information from subpoenas that may have embarrassed the government or contradicted the show version. Unlike the NTSB, ICAO can call both people and documents and rely on the governments involved - in this incident, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and South Korea - to provide evidence voluntarily.
Initial ICAO investigation (1983)
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) had only one experience investigating the air disaster before the shooting of KALÃ,007. This was the February 21, 1973 incident, when the Flight of the Libyan Arab Flight 114 was shot down by an Israeli F-4 jet over the Sinai Peninsula. The ICAO Convention obliges the countries in the region where the accident occurred (the Soviet Union) to conduct joint investigations with the country of registration (South Korea), the country whose air traffic controls the aircraft below (Japan), as well as the aircraft manufacturer (Boeing).
The ICAO investigation, led by Caj Frostell, has no authority to force the states involved to submit evidence, rather than having to rely on what they voluntarily submit. As a result, the investigation has no access to sensitive evidence such as radar data, wiretapping, ATC tape, or Flight Data Recorders (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) (whose discovery is kept by the US). A number of simulations were performed with the help of Boeing and Litton (makers of navigation systems).
ICAO released their report December 2, 1983, which concluded that the violation of Soviet airspace was unintentional: One of the two explanations for aircraft deviations is that autopilot stays in HEADING instead of INS mode after departing from Anchorage. They postulated that this flight navigation error was caused by a crew failure to select INS mode, or inertia navigation was inactive when selected, because the plane was too far off the track. It is determined that the crew does not see this error or then performs a navigation check, which will reveal that the plane is further away from the specified route. This was later attributed to the "lack of situational awareness and coordination of the flight deck".
The report included statements by the Soviet Government that claimed "no residual casualties, instruments or their components or flight recorders have so far been found". This statement was later proven to be untrue by the release of Boris Yeltsin in 1993 from a November 1983 memo of KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to Yuri Andropov. The memo states "In the third decade of October this year the equipment in question (flight recorder parameters and voice communications recorders by aircraft crew with ground air traffic control stations and among themselves) was taken to the search ship and forwarded to Moscow by air for decoding and a translation at the Air Force Scientific Research Institute. "The Soviet government's next statement will be contradicted by a Soviet civilian divers who later recalls that they saw the plane debris on the seabed for the first time on September 15, two weeks after the plane was shot down.
Following the publication of the report, ICAO adopted a resolution condemning the Soviet Union for the attack. In addition, the report resulted in unanimous amendment in May 1984 - though not valid until October 1, 1998 - to the International Civil Aviation Convention which defines the use of force against civil aircraft in more detail. The amendments to section 3 (d) partly state: "Contracting States recognize that each State shall refrain from using arms against civilian aircraft in flight and that, in the case of interception, the lives of persons on board and aircraft safety are not may be endangered. "
AS. Air Force radar data
It is common for the Air Force to confiscate radar tracks involving possible litigation in cases of aviation accidents. In civil litigation for damages, the US Department of Justice explained that the recording of an Air Force radar installation in King Salmon, Alaska relating to KAL 007 flight in the Bethel area has been destroyed and therefore can not be assigned to the plaintiff. Initially Justice Department lawyer Jan Van Flatern stated that they were destroyed 15 days after the shooting. Later, he said he was "wrong talk" and changed the time of destruction to 30 hours after the event. A Pentagon spokesman agreed, saying that the tapes were recycled for reuse from 24-30 hours afterwards; the fate of KAL 007 is known within this time frame.
Interim development
Hans Ephraimson-Abt, whose daughter, Alice Ephraimson-Abt, died on a flight, leading the American Association for Families of Victims KALÃ, 007 . He alone pursued three US administrations for answers about flight, flew to Washington 250 times and met with 149 State Department officials. After the US dissolution, Ephraimson-Abt persuaded US Senators Ted Kennedy, Sam Nunn, Carl Levin, and Bill Bradley to write a letter to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev requesting information about the flight.
Glasnost reforms in the same year brought about the relaxation of press censorship; consequently, reports began appearing in the Soviet press which showed that the Soviet military knew the locations of the wreckage and had flight data recorders. On December 10, 1991, Senator Jesse Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Boris Yeltsin to request information on the survival of passengers and crew of KALÃ,007 including the fate of Congressman Larry McDonald.
On June 17, 1992, President Yeltsin revealed that after the coup attempt failed in 1991, a joint effort was made to find Soviet-era documents relating to KAL 007. He cited the discovery of "a memorandum from the KGB to the Communist Party Central Committee," stating that the tragedy had occurred and added that there was a document "that would clarify the whole picture." Yeltsin said the memo kept saying that "these documents are so hidden that it is doubtful that our children will be able to find them." On September 11, 1992, Yeltsin officially acknowledged the existence of the recorder, and promised to grant to the South Korean government the transcript of the flight recorder's content as found in the KGB file.
In October 1992, Hans Ephraimson-Abt led a delegation of family and State Department officials to Moscow at the invitation of President Yeltsin. During the state ceremony at St. Catherine's Hall in the Kremlin, KAL's family delegation was given a portfolio containing partial transcripts of the KAL-007 cockpit voice recorder, translated into Russian, and Politburo documents relating to the tragedy.
In November 1992, President Yeltsin handed two recording containers to Korean President Roh Tae-Woo, but not the tape itself. The following month, ICAO chose to reopen the KAL 007 investigation to take into account the newly released information. The records were submitted to ICAO in Paris on 8 January 1993. Also handed over at the same time were land records for Soviet military air communications. The tape was written by the Bureau d'EnquÃÆ'ªtes et d'Analyses pour la sà © à © curitÃÆ' © de l'Aviation Civile (BEA) in Paris before representatives from Japan, the Russian Federation, South Korea, and the United States.
The 1993 official investigation by the Russian Federation liberated the hierarchy of Soviet blame, determined that the incident was a case of misidentification. On 28 May 1993, ICAO presented its second report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Soviet memorandum
In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed five secret memos dating from a few weeks after the decline of KALÃ,007 in 1983. The memo contained Soviet communications (from KGB Chief Viktor Chebrikov and Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov to Secretary General Yury Andropo
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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